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In this paper we analyse the set of scalar algebraic Riccati equations (ARE) that play an
important role in nding feedback Nash equilibria of the scalar N-player linear-quadratic
dierential game. We show that in general there exist maximal 2N   1 solutions of the
(ARE) that give rise to a Nash equilibrium. In particular we analyse the number of
equilibria as a function of the state-feedback parameter and present both necessary and
sucient conditions for existence of a unique solution of the (ARE). Furthermore, we
derive conditions under which the set of state-feedback parameters for which there is a
unique solution grows with the number of players in the game.





During the last decade there has been an increasing interest to study several prob-
lems in economics using a dynamic game theoretical setting. In particular in the area of
environmental economics and macro-economic policy coordination this is a very natural
framework to model problems (see e.g. Engwerda et al. (1999-a) for references). In,
e.g., policy coordination problems usually two basic questions arise i.e., rst, are policies
coordinated and, second, which information do the participating parties have. Usual-
ly both these points are rather unclear and, therefore, strategies for dierent possible
scenarios are calculated and compared with eachother. One of these scenarios is the
so-called feedback Nash scenario (see Basar and Olsder (1999) for a precise denition
and survey of relevant literature).
Note that, since according this scenario the participating parties can react to eachother's
policies, its economic relevance is mostly larger than that of the open-loop Nash scenari-
o. In particular the feedback Nash scenario is very popular in studying problems where
the underlying model can be described by a (set of) linear dierential equation(s) and
the individual objectives, the parties are striving for, can be approximated by function-
s which quadratically penalize deviations from some (equilibrium) targets. Under the
assumption that the parties only have a nite-planning horizon, this problem was rst
analyzed by Starr and Ho in (1969) (see also Lukes (1971) for a result on uniqueness
within the class of ane memoryless strategies).
In this paper we study the innite-planning horizon case and concentrate here on solving
the with this problem associated algebraic Riccati equations. In Weeren et al. (1999) it
was shown that in the two-player scalar case these equations have either one or three so-
lutions which solve the optimization problem (see also Engwerda (1999-b) for a detailed
study under which conditions on the system parameters these dierent situations occur).
In this paper we study the general N-player scalar case. We show that for any number
N of players there exists a positive number such that if the state-feedback parameter is
larger than this number, there exist (in general) 2N   1 solutions for the (ARE) equa-
tions yielding a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we give both necessary and sucient
conditions under which there is exact one solution for the (ARE) equations. We also
show that this situation is more likely to occur in case the number of players grows.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section two we start by stating the problem
analysed in this paper. Section three analyzes the solutions of the algebraic Riccati equa-
tions. These results are used in section four to nd necessary and sucient conditions
for existence of a unique solution. Section ve presents some results on the eect on the
uniqueness conditions of an increase of the number of players in the game. The paper
ends with some concluding remarks.
II. Problem statement
In this paper we consider the problem where N parties (henceforth called players) try to
2
minimize their individual quadratic performance criterion. Each player controls a dier-





biui; x(0) = x0: (1)
Here x is the state of the system, ui is a (control) variable player i can manipulate, x0 is
the arbitrarily chosen initial state of the system, a (the state feedback parameter) and
bi; i = 1; ::; N are constant system parameters, and _x denotes the time derivative of x.
The performance criterion player i = 1; ::; N aims to minimize is:






We assume that both qi and rii are positive and bi diers from zero.
In this paper we consider the existence of limiting stationary feedback Nash equilibria
of this dierential game.







sjkj) + qi + kisiki = 0; i = 1; ::; N; (2)
where si := bir
 1
ii bi.
Given our assumptions on the system parameters one can immediately deduce from
Basar and Olsder (1999, proposition 6.8) that:
Theorem 1:
Let ki  0 solve the set of Riccati equations.
Then the stationary feedback policies
ui =  r 1ii bi kix (3)
i = 1; ::; N , provide a Nash equilibrium, leading to the cost Ji(u1; ::; uN) := x0 kix0, for
player i.




ki, is asymptotically stable. 2
In fact, we conclude from Weeren et al (1999, corollary 3.1) that when the players are
restricted at the outset to memoryless strategies (cf. Lukes (1971)) then existence of a
positive solution to the above scalar Riccati equations is a both necessary and sucient
condition for existence of a feedback Nash equilibrium.
A natural question which arises is how many solutions the above set of algebraic Riccati
equations (ARE) have. To analyze this question we introduce (for notational conve-
nience) the variables:
i := siqi and i := siki; i = 1; ::; N; and N+1 =  acl:
3
Using this notation (2) can be rewritten as
2i   2N+1i + i = 0; i = 1; ::; N: (4)
The above question can therefore be reformulated as under which conditions the above





have a positive solution i; i = 1; ::; N + 1.
In the next section we will study this problem in detail.
III. The solution set
We will assume, without loss of generality, that the i's satisfy 1  2  3 
:::  N . Provided that
p
1  N+1 we have that the rst N equations always
have two positive solutions. From (4) we have that either i = N+1 +
q
2N+1   i
or i = N+1  
q
2N+1   i; i = 1; ::; N . Substitution of this into (5) shows that
N+1 >
p
1 must satisfy the following equation




2N+1   N = a: (6)
To study the number of solutions to these equations, we introduce the next recursively
dened functions for n = 1; ::; N   1:
fn+1i (x) := f
n
i (x) + x 
q
x2   n+1; i = 1; ::; 2n (7)
fn+1i+2n(x) := f
n
i (x) + x+
q
x2   n+1; i = 1; ::; 2n (8)
with
f11 (x) :=  
q
x2   1 and f12 (x) :=
q
x2   1: (9)
It is easily veried (by induction) that due to this construction the functions fNi satisfy





1); i = 1; ::; 2
N   1: (10)
In particular, the next three functions will play an important role in the subsequent
analysis




x2   i (11)
fN2 (x) = (N   1)x+
q




x2   i (12)
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and
fN3 (x) = (N   1)x 
q
x2   1 +
q




x2   i: (13)
Now, (6) has a solution if and only if fNi = a has a solution for some i 2 1; ::; 2N .
Furthermore, it is obvious from this relationship that the number of solutions to (ARE)





i   a) = 0: (14)
For the moment, concentrate on the 2-player case. It is easily veried that the above
equation (14) has then the following algebraic structure
f(a0; a1; a2) := (a0   a1   a2)(a0 + a1   a2)(a0   a1 + a2)(a0 + a1 + a2) = 0: (15)
The structure of f for the general N -player case is similar and is omitted in order to
avoid unnecessary cumbersome notation. From this it is not dicult to see that f only
has quadratic entries. That is, more precisely,
Lemma 2:




i for some nonnegative
integers ki satisfying
PN
i=0 2ki = 2
N .
Proof:
It is easily veried that f( a0; a1; ::; aN) = ( 1)2Nf(a0; ::; aN) = f(a0; ::; aN) and, also,
f(a0; ::; ai; ::; aN) = f(a0; ::; ai; ::; aN); for any i 2 1; ::; N:
Now, assume that f has a term in which, e.g., a0 has an odd exponent. Then, collect
all terms of f containing odd exponents in a0. As a consequence f = a0g(a0; ::; aN) +
h(a0; ::; aN), where in all terms of both g and h a0 appears with an even exponent. Since
f( a0; a1; ::; aN) = f(a0; a1; ::; aN) we conclude immediately from this that g must be
zero. The rest of the proof follows then straightforwardly. 2
Using this lemma we can then easily derive the following result on the number of solu-
tions to the (ARE) equations
Theorem 3:
(ARE) always has at least one and at most 2N   1 positive solutions.
Proof:
Consider equation (14). Let a0 := (n  1)x  a and ai :=
p
x2   i. With this notation,
equation (14) coincides with (15). According lemma 2 this equation is a polynomial in
x of degree 2N .
Next, we show that this polynomial has at most 2N   1 roots larger than p1. To that
end we rst note that f can be rewritten as
f = 2
N 2
i=1 (a0   (a1 + gi))(a0 + (a1 + gi))(a0   (a1   gi))(a0 + (a1   gi)); (16)
5
where gi is a linear combination (with coecients +1 or  1) of a2; ::; aN.




0  (a1+ gi)2)(a20  (a1  gi)2): Now at
x =
p
1, a1 = 0. Therefore we conclude that at x =
p




0   (gi)2)2 > 0:
Furthermore, it is easily veried that except for the term a0 
PN
i=1 ai, all terms a0a1gi
in (16) are positive if x ! 1. Therefore, the leading term x2N of the polynomial has
a negative sign. So, we conclude that the polynomial has always a root located at the
lefthandside of
p
1. Or stated dierently, (ARE) has at most 2
N   1 positive solutions.
To see that (ARE) always has at least one solution, we study the equations fN1 (x) = a








1). Since both functions are
continuous with limx!1 fN1 =  1 and limx!1 fN2 =1, it is clear that either the equa-
tion fN1 (x) = a or f
N
2 (x) = a will have a solution x 
p
1, which completes the proof. 2
To get an impression how the number of solutions of (ARE) varies with the state pa-
rameter a, we sketched in gure 1 for the three player case the curves f3i .












Figure 1: The curves f3i for 1 = 9; 2 = 8; 3 = 5:
From this gure we see, by counting the number of points of the dierent curves f3i
which have level a, that the number of solutions of (ARE) increases monotonically from
1 to 7 as a function of a. That this monotonicity does in general not hold is illustrated
by the next gure 2, where we plotted for dierent parameter values f32 and f
3
3 . Since
f31 is a monotonically decreasing function and f
3
i (x)  f33 (x) for i > 3 (as we will show
later on (see lemma 7)), we see that the number of solutions rst increases from 1 to 3
and then drops back to 1 before it increases again.
In particular note from these examples that an even number of solutions occurs only
at isolated points for a, whereas an uneven number of solutions occurs at intervals for a.
We will not elaborate this subject further here, but it seems that this property holds in
general.
6








Figure 2: The curves f32 and f
3
3 for 1 = 9; 2 = 8:7; 3 = 8:65:
Next, we show that the functions fNi (x) do not intersect if x becomes large. To prove
this property we rst concentrate on the case that all i dier. So, we assume from now
on that 1 > 2 > :::N.
The next lemma is a preliminary result used to show the correctness of theorem 5.
Lemma 4:
Assume that all i dier. Then, there exists a constant x1 such that the functions
fNi (x); i = 2; ::; 2
N do not intersect on the interval (x1;1).
Proof:
We show that any two functions fNi and f
N
j only have a nite number of intersection
points, from which the conclusion is then obvious.
So, assume fNi (x) = f
N
j (x). Since all 's dier the equation f
N




x2   1 + :::+ bN
q
x2   N) = 0; (17)
where bi 2 f 1; 0; 1g and not all bi are simultaneously zero. Now, denote bi
p
x2   i by
ai(x). Then the question as whether (17) has a nite number of zero's can be rephrased
whether
PN
i=1 ai(x) = 0 has a nite number of zero's. To prove that this is the case, we
restrict for the moment to the case N = 3. How the general case can be proved will be
clear from this.
So, we have to prove that a1 + a2 + a3 = 0 has only a nite number of zero's. Like in
(15) we consider now the following function
f(a1; a2; a3) := (a1   a2   a3)(a1 + a2   a3)(a1   a2 + a3)(a1 + a2 + a3) = 0:
Obviously, a1 + a2 + a3 = 0 has a nite number of zero's, if f has a nite number of
7
zero's. However, from lemma 2 we know that f is a polynomial which degree is at most
8. So, f has at most 8 zero's, which proves the claim. 2
Next, consider fN2 (x). By dierentiating f
N
2 (x) it is easily veried that f
N
2 (x) will
be monotonically increasing for all x  x1 for some number x1 >
p
1. Furthermore,





it follows that there exists a positive number a1 such that for all a  a1 the equa-
tion fN2 (x) = a has exactly one solution. A similar reasoning holds for all the other
fNi (x); i = 2; ::; 2
N (see also gure 1 for a visualization in case N = 3). Next, take the
maximum over all ai . Since according lemma 4 for a xed a the solutions for f
N
i (x) = a
dier for all i if a is chosen large enough, it is easily veried that the corresponding solu-
tions (1; :::; N) to (4,5) will also dier. So, it is clear then that the next conclusion holds
Theorem 5:
Assume that i dier. Then, there exists a positive number â such that for every state
feedback parameter a  â the set of algebraic Riccati equations (2) has 2N  1 (positive)
solutions. 2
Remark 6:
In case the i do not dier, it is easily veried from the above analysis that a similar
conclusion holds. That is, there exists a number â such that for all a > â the number
of solutions to (ARE) does not increase anymore. This number equals the number of
distinct (ultimately) monotonically increasing functions fNi . Without providing a formal
proof we note that if one denotes by s the number of i's that coincide, some carefull








+ (s  1)2N s   1;





counts the number of solutions
that do not coincide with any other solution; (s 1)2N s counts the number of solutions
that occur multiple times and  1 comes from the number of monotonically decreasing
functions. Furthermore, it is easily veried that if N = s, the number of solutions equals
[N
2
] + 1. Here [N
2




] = 1). So, e.g. if
N = 5 and 1 = 2 = 3 > 4 > 5, s = 3 and the maximum number of solutions will
be 15. 2
IV. Uniqueness conditions
In this section we will give both necessary and sucient conditions under which (ARE)
will have a unique solution. To solve this problem, we study the functions fNi as dened
8
in (7,8) in some more detail. First we note that
Lemma 7:
For every N  2 the following inequalities hold: fN1  fN2  fN3  fNi for any i  4.
Proof:
The proof is by induction.
For N = 2, f21 (x) = x  
p
x2   1  
p
x2   2, f22 (x) = x +
p
x2   1  
p
x2   2,
f23 (x) = x  
p
x2   1 +
p
x2   2 and f24 (x) = x +
p
x2   1 +
p
x2   2. Since by
assumption 1  2, the correctness of all inequalities follows by straightforward veri-
cation.
Now, assume the inequalities hold for N = k. Then, by denition, for i = 1; 2; 3 we
have fk+1i (x) = f
k
i (x) + x  
q
x2   k+1  fki+1(x) + x  
q
x2   k+1 = fk+1i+1 (x): In a




x2   k+1  fk4 (x)+x q
x2   k+1 = fk+14 (x); and for i = 2k + 1; ::; 2k+1 fk+1i+2k (x) = fki (x) + x+
q
x2   k+1 
fk4 (x) + x 
q
x2   k+1 = fk+14 (x): 2
By dierentiating (11) it is obvious that fN1 (x) is a strict monotonically decreasing func-
tion. Furthermore, it is easily veried in the same way that all other functions fNi (x)
are strictly monotonically increasing for all x > x1 for some x1. In the next theorem
we will use this together with the previous lemma to derive conditions under which the
(ARE) will have only one poitive solution. But, rst, we introduce a convention w.r.t.
local versus global extrema. With a local extremum we mean an extremum which oc-
curs somewhere on the open interval (
p
1;1); whereas for the denition of a global
extremum we take the whole domain of denition [
p
1;1):
Furthermore, we need some technical results presented in the next lemma.
Lemma 8:
i) If 1 > 2, f
N
3 (x) has exact one local minimum.
ii) fN2 (x) has at most two local extrema.
iii) If fN2 (x) has a local minimum, then arg minf
N
3 (x)  arg local minimum fN2 (x):
Proof:








1 > 2, limx#p1 f
N 0
3 (x) =  1 and limx!1 fN
0







(x2 2)3=2 : Since 1  2 it is clear that f
N"
3 (x) > 0. So, f
N 0
3 (x) has
exact one zero, from which the conclusion is obvious.
ii) Dierentiation of fN2 (x) (see (12)) yields f
N 0













(x2 1)3=2 : Now, assume f
N"
2 (x) has a zero at p. Some





(p2 i)3=2 : Substitution of
9





























(x2   1)3=2(p2   i)3=2   (x2   i)3=2(p2   1)3=2




(x2   1)(p2   i)  
q










> 0, if and only if x > p. From this it follows then
easily that fN"2 (x) will have only one root and that f
N 0
2 (x) will have a local minimum at
p. The stated result follows then directly.
iii) Assume fN3 (x) has a local minimum at p, so f
N 0
3 (p) = 0. From this we have that




: Substitution of this expression into fN
0
2 (p + ) yields
then for positive 
fN
0




(p+ )2   i
+
p+ q












(p+ )2   i
+
p+ q
(p+ )2   1
=
p + q
(p + )2   1
  p+ q













(p + )2   i
)
> 0;






(2 i)3=2 ; for some p <  < p + .
So, the derivative of fN
0
2 (x) is always positive at the righthandside of the local minimum
of fN
0
2 (x), which proves the claim. 2
Theorem 9:
Assume that 1 > 2. Then, (ARE) has exactly one positive solution if and only if either
one of the next conditions is satised
i) if fN2 is monotonically increasing and a < minf
N
3 .
ii) if fN2 is not monotonically increasing and a satises either I. a < local minimum
fN2 (x) or II. local maximum f
N





First consider the case that fN2 (x) is monotonically increasing. Since f
N
1 (x) is strict






1), it is obvious from the fact that
fNi (x)  fN3 (x); i = 4; ::; 2N (see lemma 7) that for a xed a there will be only one
intersection point with the functions fNi (x) if and only if a is smaller than the global
minimum of fN3 (x) (see e.g. gure 1).
Next, consider the case that fN2 (x) is not monotonically increasing. According lemma
8.ii, fN2 (x) has then a local maximumand a local minimum. Furthermore, (see lemma 8.i
and iii) this local minimum is located at the lefthandside of the local minimum of fN3 (x)
(see gure 2 for an illustration of this situation). Since fN3 (x)  fN2 (x) it is clear that for
all a smaller than the local minimum of fN2 (x), there will be only one intersection point
with the dierent fNi . Obviously, when a is located between the local minimum and the
local maximum of fN2 (x) there will be three solutions. In case the local minimum of
fN3 (x) is larger than the local maximum value of f
N
2 (x), the number of solutions drops,
again, to 1. If a is larger than this local minimum of fN3 (x), there will always be at least
one intersection point with fN2 (x) and one with f
N
3 (x), which concludes the proof. 2
Remark 10:
In case 1 = 2, f
N
2 (x) and f
N




i (x); i = 1; ::; 4 coincide.
From this it is easily seen that there will be exact one intersection point of a with all
these functions if and only if a is smaller than the global minimum of fN2 (x) (in fact this
inequality has to be strict in case fN2 (x) has a local minimum (which is then also the
global one)). 2
In the following gure we illustrate, for xed i, the two possibilities that can occur
for the set of parameters a for which there is a unique equilibrium
0 a1 a2 a
1 1 3! m m # eq.
0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a
1 1 3 1 3! m m # eq.
Figure 3: Structure of sets where (ARE) has a unique positive solution.
Here m  2N   1 denotes the maximum number of solutions.
We conclude this section with three related issues.
First we like to mention that in case 1  2+:::+N , fN2 (x) is monotonically increasing.
This can be shown by a direct evaluation of its derivative. We have
fN
0









































































So, under this condition we have that the set of a-parameters for which there is a unique
solution to the (ARE) equations is given by a half line.




1   2 there will always be a unique
solution too. To show this, rst note from theorem 8 that whenever a < minimum fN2 ,
there will be a unique solution to the (ARE). It is easily veried that f22 is monotonical-






1   2: Since
fN2 (x)  fN+12 (x), the rest of the argument follows by induction.
Finally, the third issure we like to address is that in Engwerda (1999-b) it was shown,
for the two player case, that the additional requirement that amongst all (ARE) solu-
tions we look for a solution which minimizes aggregate performance always gives rise
to a unique solution. Unfortunately this property does not hold for the general case,
as we can see from gure 1. In this gure we see that the curves f34 and f
3
5 intersect
at some point (4; a
) (approximately (3.2,6.5)). From (5) we therefore conclude that
at this point for both solutions we have that 1 + 2 + 3 = 

4 + a
. Now, choose the
parameters bi and ri such that s1 = s2 = s3 = 1 (and consequently, q1 = 9; q2 = 8 and
q3 = 5). Then ki = i and consequently the cost player i has at this equilibrium is x
2
0i.
So, the aggregate cost is x20(1+2+3). Consequently, at a = a
 two dierent solutions
yield the same aggregate cost, which is obviously (see gure 1 again) also the minimum
attainable aggregate cost in this case.
V. Uniqueness versus the number of players
Next we consider the inuence of the number of players on the uniqueness conditions
we derived in the previous section. We address the question whether the parameter set
for a for which there is a unique solution to (ARE), increases if the number of players
increases. This would sustain the intuition that in a noncooperative game it becomes
more dicult to reach an agreement in case the number of players increases.
To analyze this problem we introduce for a xed sequence 1  2  :::  N  :::,
the set UN := faj (ARE) has a unique positive solutiong. The following lemma is an
immediate consequence of an exhaustive analyses of theorem 9.
Lemma 11:
12
UN  UN+1 if and only if either one of the next three conditions holds:
1) fN+12 is monotonically increasing;
2) local minimum fN+12 > minimum f
N
3 ;




If N !  > 0 then there exists an N such that for all N > N UN  UN+1.
Proof:
We will show that under the above assumption, condition 3) of lemma 11 is satised if
N !1. To that end we rst note that:
local maximumfN2 (x)  fN2 (
p


































N1   i >
q
(N   1)1. Therefore,

















N1   2 (2):
Comparing (1) and (2), elementary analysis shows that for N large enough, condition 3)
of lemma 11 will be satised. 2
Remark 13:
Since fNi (x)  fN+1i (x); i = 1; ::; 2N , in principle the set UN shifts to the right. There-
fore, in the case illustrated in gure 2, we have that by taking here all i for i > 3
approximately zero, UN will never be included in UN+1. We illustrated this phenomenon
in gure 4. So, the assumption in theorem 12 that  > 0 is essential.
IV. Concluding remarks
In this paper we studied the positive solutions of the algebraic Riccati equations that
play an important role in the study of limiting stationary feedback Nash equilibria in the
N-player linear quadratic scalar dierential game. We showed that this set of equations
13











Figure 3: The curves f32 and f
4
2 for 1 = 9; 2 = 8:7; 3 = 8:65; 4 = 0:5:
always has a nite number of dierent positive solutions and that this number is bounded
by 2N   1. In particular we analyzed the set of state parameters for which the (ARE)
have a unique solution. Fixing all other system parameters, we saw that this set is either
a half line or the union of a half line and an open (bounded) interval. We showed how
this set can be determined from the analysis of two scalar functions. It turned out that
for all stable systems there will always be a unique solution to the (ARE) equations. In
this respect it is interesting to recall from the two-player case (see Engwerda (1999-b))
that whenever the system is not stable, there always exist combinations of the remaining
system parameters such that the (ARE) have more than one positive solutions.
On the other hand we showed that there is always a threshold such that if the state
feedback parameter exceeds this threshold (assuming all other system parameters again
xed), the number of positive solutions will not increase. In general this number of
positive solutions is 2N   1.
In between these two limiting cases, the number of solutions gradually increases from
1 to this maximum number if the system feedback parameter grows. However, this in-
crease is (in general) not monotonically. So, roughly spoken, the conclusion is that the
larger the instability of the system is, the more positive solutions the (ARE) equations
will have.
The above outcomes raise a couple of new questions. Two of them are, rst, whether
aggregate eciency can be used as an additional constraint to determine a unique equi-
librium amongst all solutions of the (ARE). We showed in an example that this is not
the case. Second, whether the set of parameters for which there will be a unique equilib-
rium will always increase if the number of players in the game increases. In general the
answer to this second question is negative too. Only in case some parameter condition
is satised, which can be interpreted as that the new players really have both an interest
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and can inuence the game, the assertion holds (in the end).
One of the main remaining topics is of course how things generalize for the multivariable
case. We hope that the obtained results may be helpfull in analyzing this problem.
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